# U.S. Supreme Court - Chatrie v. United States, June 29, 2026 > *Audited source extract. The dossier was used only as a lead; the underlying source was independently acquired and checked on 2026-07-20.* ## Source metadata - **Publisher:** Supreme Court of the United States - **Original dossier URL:** https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/25pdf/25-112_0am4.pdf - **Resolved/canonical URL used:** https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/25pdf/25-112_0am4.pdf - **Publication date:** 2026-06-29 - **Underlying event or version:** 2026-06-29 - **Archived:** 2026-07-20, from unauthenticated public access; no cookies, tokens, or login state retained - **Wayback snapshot:** save failed on 2026-07-20 after the archive service returned HTTP 403; retry pending ## Verification verdict **supported with narrower wording** — Chatrie held that police acquisition of Google Location History was a Fourth Amendment search even for a limited period. It is not an ALPR holding; the Court left warrant particularity, probable cause, and reasonableness to the Fourth Circuit on remand. ## Claim boundary This source is authoritative only within the source class and limitations stated above. ## Extract **Extracted-text lines 132-136:** > F. Supp. 3d 901, 905, 937–938. A divided panel of the Fourth Circuit > affirmed on different reasoning, holding that no search occurred be­ > cause Chatrie “did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in two > hours’ worth of Location History data voluntarily exposed to Google.” > 107 F. 4th 319, 325. The Fourth Circuit granted rehearing en banc **Extracted-text lines 139-143:** > Court granted certiorari solely on the question whether the police vio­ > lated the Fourth Amendment in obtaining Chatrie’s location data. > Held: Police officers conducted a Fourth Amendment search when they > acquired Chatrie’s location data from Google because an individual has > a reasonable expectation of privacy in his cell-phone location infor­ **Extracted-text lines 323-327:** > standard generally requires that they seek a warrant from “a neutral > and detached magistrate,” Johnson v. United States, 333 U. S. 10, 14, > who may issue a warrant only when “probable cause is properly estab­ > lished and the scope of the authorized search is set out with particu­ > larity,” Kentucky v. King, 563 U. S. 452, 459. The warrant issued here, **Extracted-text lines 347-351:** > up to the Court of Appeals to decide whether, at each step of the search > process, the warrant satisfied the Fourth Amendment’s requirements > of particularity and probable cause. Pp. 29–32. > 136 F. 4th 100, vacated and remanded. > KAGAN, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which ROBERTS, C. J., **Extracted-text lines 470-474:** > cell phone’s location, and police intrude on that constitu­ > tionally protected interest when they demand the infor­ > mation—even though for only a limited time, and from a > third-party tech company. We leave to the Court of Appeals > the further question whether, given the warrant issued, the **Wayback failure**: The bounded Save Page Now pass stopped after the archive service returned HTTP 403 on the first request. This source was not individually retried; retry pending. ## Notes - Tier: 2 — Tier 2 primary public record. - The excerpt is bounded to the claims audited here; consult the preserved original for full context. - Cited by: see `citing_pages:` frontmatter; populated after wiki integration.