# Cellebrite DI Ltd. Form 20-F for FY2022 > *Cellebrite DI Ltd.'s annual report for the fiscal year ended December 31, 2022, filed with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission. The cited sections describe the Israeli encryption-control regime, its relationship to the Wassenaar dual-use framework, and the 2020 Hong Kong UFED petition.* ## Source metadata - **Publisher:** Cellebrite DI Ltd.; filed through SEC EDGAR. - **URL:** https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1854587/000162828023013355/cele-20221231.htm - **Archived:** 2026-07-30 through the official EDGAR page in a browser; the original companion is the complete serialized filing DOM. - **Wayback snapshot:** https://web.archive.org/web/20260730140241/https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1854587/000162828023013355/cele-20221231.htm ## Extract ### Israeli encryption controls and Wassenaar > "We are subject to Israeli regulations controlling the export of encryption technology. The Wassenaar Arrangement is a multilateral export control regime with 42 participating states. Although Israel is not a party to the Wassenaar Arrangement, it has adopted the Wassenaar Arrangement List of Dual Use Goods and Technologies and the goods and technologies listed therein are subject to Israeli export control laws and regulations." > "However, cryptography that is subject to Israeli encryption control laws is not regulated under the Israeli export control regime, even where its capabilities would otherwise place such cryptography within Part 2 of Chapter 5 of the Wassenaar Arrangement Dual Use List which relates to Information Security. Israeli law instead subjects such cryptography goods and technologies to its own encryption control regime, which includes export restrictions." > "Our export license under the Israeli encryption control regime prohibit us from exporting our controlled products to customers in certain countries and require us to obtain the consent of the Ministry of Defense to export controlled products to customers in certain other countries. We understand that these restrictions are based, among other things, on both considerations of national security and the Israeli government's assessment of the human rights record of the country in question." ### Hong Kong UFED petition > "In August 2020, a group of 61 petitioners, including a number of human rights activists, filed a petition before the District Court in Tel Aviv against various Israeli government entities and Cellebrite. The petition asked the District Court to exercise its power under the Defense Export Control Law to stop the exportation of our UFED solution to police forces in Hong Kong." The filing characterizes the petitioners' claims as allegations and says Cellebrite subsequently adopted policies intended to prevent sales to customers in China and Hong Kong. ### Scope caveat > "Currently, some of our solutions are not subject to any export control laws." ## Notes - Tier 2 — an official SEC filing and the company's primary disclosure of the regulatory regime it understood to govern its products at the time. - Cited by: [[Cellebrite — Export Controls and Human-Rights Record]].