# Flock Network Sharing / Hot Lists The umbrella concept for **all data-flow mechanisms Flock's platform enables across organizational boundaries**. Encompasses (a) network sharing — granting another org search access to your camera reads; (b) hot list sharing — pushing a custom plate-of-interest list to another org's alert feed; (c) federal-prefix sharing — the special case of federal-LE access via the `[Federal]` org convention. The Conway production documents all three at scale. Van Buren's 2024 grant narrative adds a prospective sharing statement: the department said it would share access and use of two added LPRs with in-state and out-of-state law-enforcement agencies. The packet does not identify actual organizations, sharing directions, dates, permissions, users, or activity ([[Van Buren JAG Grant-Funded Flock Cameras]], `ARDOT Financial Report Forms.pdf`, p. 12). ## How it appears in the corpus - **[[SharedNetworks 2025-12-17 Snapshot]]** — 1,384 organizations in Conway's sharing topology as of 12/17/2025. Bidirectional: 486. Inbound-only: 471. Outbound-only: 427. Geographic spread across 38+ states. - **[[North Little Rock Flock SharedNetworks Snapshot 2026-07-16]]** — 1,616 organization rows: 1,113 with an NLRPD network shared outward, 1,027 with a network shared inward, and 524 with both directions populated. Its two outward labels distinguish `North Little Rock AR PD` from `North Little Rock AR PD - Genetec LPR`. - **[[Escambia County FL SO Hot List Share]]** — A custom hot list pushed from Florida to Conway via the platform alone (no MOU, no countersignature). - **[[Home Depot Camera Sharing Series]]** — A corporate-coordinated, state-wide rollout of private-business camera sharing into Arkansas LE agencies, executed in spring 2026 across six Conway-area stores (more nationally). - **[[Federal Searches CSV]]** — 5,929 federal-tagged Flock lookup rows in March–April 2026; the file does not name the networks searched or returned. - The **"Flock Network Sharing Tool" PDF series** (`pg1`, `pg2`, `pg3`, `pg5`, `7`, `8`, `9`, `11`, `13` files in the production) is the vendor's customer-facing documentation of the sharing UI — captures the admin-UI workflow agencies use to configure sharing. Per-file ingest deferred to second pass. - **[[PCSO ALPR Six-Month Practice and Usage Report]]** — the activity-side data for the [[Pulaski County Sheriff's Office]] Flock deployment. Of 2,092 alerts in Jan 1 – May 19 2026, **1,645 (79%)** came from "Other Custom Hotlist Alerts on Your Networks" — alerts triggered by custom hot lists other agencies own and share into PCSO's networks. PCSO is itself enumerated in Conway PD's [[SharedNetworks 2025-12-17 Snapshot]] (row 279); the two productions describe the same network from two operating ends. - **Lonoke County portal snapshot** — 741 entries under organizations granted access to Lonoke data and 1,984 under organizations sharing data with Lonoke. The lists are vendor-hosted configuration evidence, not proof of searches or device-level scope (vendor primary/self-description, [Lonoke County AR SO Transparency Portal](../../web%20archive/2026-07-28/transparency.flocksafety.com/lonoke-county-ar-so.md)). - **Jonesboro activity and policy records** — monthly Flock sheets separately report official and custom matches, while Policy 715.02 requires manually entered plates to carry a documented reason and outside dissemination to be recorded in a secondary-dissemination log. The completion package does not include the current SharedNetworks or dissemination export ([[Jonesboro Flock and Axon ALPR Activity Logs 2025-2026]]; [[Jonesboro UAS RTCC and ALPR Policies 714 and 715]], `2025 Policy Manual-Complete.pdf`, p. 414). ## Stakeholders - **Agency administrators** — Flock says administrators control whether and how an agency shares. [[Andrew Burningham]] is documented as a Conway Flock administrator, but the corpus does not attribute individual relationship decisions to him. - **Counterparty administrators** — toggle on their end. - **Flock** — defines the abstraction (network, hot list, federal prefix) and operates the platform infrastructure. ## Timeline The Conway-specific sharing arrangements develop over the deployment's lifetime; the [[SharedNetworks 2025-12-17 Snapshot]] is the only point-in-time view available. Notable events: - 2025-01-23 — Project kickoff; "Faulkner Co Emergency Comms Center - might give them access" candidate noted in [[AR - Conway PD - Welcome to Flock! (3) - Flock Kickoff Slide Deck]]. - 2025-12-17 — SharedNetworks snapshot generated. - 2026-01-22 — [[Escambia County FL SO Hot List Share]] notification. - 2026-03-12 — Home Depot state-wide rollout announcement. - 2026-03-12 → 2026-04-08 — Six Home Depot store shares completed for Conway. ### In PDFOI-2026-1874 (LRPD Flock emails) The Little Rock Police Department production documents the same sharing mechanisms from a second Arkansas jurisdiction, this time observed through hundreds of **[[Flock Deconfliction Advisory|Flock Deconfliction Advisories]]** — the named, automated notifications Flock generates when a hot-list search by one organization overlaps another organization's alert-owner entry for the same plate ([[Flock Deconfliction Advisories and the LRPD Sharing Network]]). Each advisory enumerates the overlapping Alert Owners' contact details and states that "the sharing of information involving this LPR overlap is the responsibility of each individual Alert Owner," making the advisory itself a sharing-coordination instrument rather than a constraint (Emails 1-24.pdf p. 416, p. 540). - **Regional Arkansas network** — Advisories show LRPD's hot-list searches overlapping a cluster of in-state agencies: [[North Little Rock Police Department]], [[Sherwood Police Department]], Springdale, Morrilton, and Pine Bluff PDs, plus Arkansas State Police alert owners at `asp.arkansas.gov` (Emails 1-24.pdf pp. 17-64; Emails 36-63.pdf pp. 622-623, 634-635, 660-661). A January 2026 advisory captures cross-agency interplay in which the originating search was run by North Little Rock PD with overlap owners spanning LRPD and ASP (Emails 36-63.pdf pp. 634-635). - **Out-of-state and fusion-center reach** — Beyond active overlaps, the production records pending Search-access requests to LRPD's Flock network from ten-plus out-of-state agencies (e.g., TN ROCIC, Riverside County CA DA, Michigan Dept. of Attorney General) and from the Missouri Information Analysis Center, a state fusion center (Emails 1-24.pdf pp. 37-40; Emails 36-63.pdf p. 658). Hot-list alerts had auto-activated with Fulton County GA SO, St. Francois County MO, Boone County AR SO, and Van Buren AR PD; LRPD sought search-only access without the bundled hotlist/VMS feed (Emails 1-24.pdf p. 186, p. 260). ### Benton County SO snapshot (2026-07-22) [[SharedNetworks 2026-07-22 Snapshot]] supplies a second large Arkansas tenant export: **1,944 organization rows**, comprising 734 reciprocal, 97 inbound-only, and 1,113 outbound-only rows including one BCSO self-row. Excluding that self-row, 1,846 other organization rows have `Benton County AR SO` in the outward-sharing field. Selected reciprocal Arkansas rows include Bentonville, Springdale, North Little Rock, Little Rock, Conway, Rogers, Jonesboro, and the US Postal Inspection Service's Flex network; selected outbound-only rows include Midwest HIDTA, Arkansas Highway Police, and Wright Patterson Air Force Base (`SharedNetworks_2026_July_22.csv`, lines 278, 444, 589, 591, 601, 694, 722, 942, 992, 1027, 1776). BCSO separately wrote that all of its Flock cameras are shared to other Arkansas agencies that have Flock. The CSV is broader than that sentence, but not necessarily contradictory: the email did not say Arkansas peers were the only recipients. Neither source establishes actual searches, alert activity, camera-level scope, permissions, approval history, or outcome. ### Cabot account export without organization-sharing scope (2026-07-21) [[Cabot Flock User Access Export]] reconstructs 140 user rows: 87 active and 53 deactivated. Forty active accounts use non-Cabot domains, and every active row shows Search and Hotlist Tool enabled. Unlike the Conway and Benton County exports, however, this is not a SharedNetworks topology file. It does not disclose which cameras or networks each account can reach, organization-level sharing direction, actual searches, alert activity, approval history, or outcomes. That gap matters because [[Cabot LPR Policy 305.1]] permits sharing captured plate data with another law-enforcement agency when it indicates evidence of an offense and says it may not otherwise be shared. [[T017 - Cabot Sharing Rule vs Unresolved External Account Scope]] remains open: the account export raises the scope question but does not prove that an outside-domain account could search Cabot reads or that Cabot violated its policy. ### Saline County screenshot production without a native export (2026-07-27) Saline County produced **85 PDF pages** of organization-sharing screenshots: 44 pages in `Questions #1 & #2.pdf` and 41 in `Questions #2 & #3.pdf` ([[Saline County Flock Inventory Contract Invoices and Sharing Printout]]; [[Saline County SharedNetworks and Deployment Printouts]]). Unlike the native Conway, Benton County, and Rogers exports, these pages carry no machine-readable schema, direction legend, reproducible row count, generation timestamp, access level, camera scope, relationship history, or approval record. The screenshots establish that organization relationships were displayed in the tenant. They do not support a topology count or prove that every visible relationship carried the same permissions. The supplement's `last 30 days of audit.pdf` re-sends the same 41 sharing pages found at `Questions #2 & #3.pdf`, pp. 1-41. Page-by-page rendered-image reconciliation found all 41 corresponding pairs, so the supplement adds no second topology, later snapshot, or native direction model ([[Saline County Recompiled Sharing and Thirty-Day Audit Packet]], pp. 1-41). ## Notes ### Vendor-stated current controls versus tenant evidence Flock's public statement distinguishes 1:1/radius/state sharing from **National Lookup**, which it describes as an opt-in network limited to a full, exact plate; it also says every search requires a reason and that searches are auditable (vendor primary/self-description, [Flock statement on network sharing and federal cooperation](../../web%20archive/2026-07-20/flocksafety.com/statement-network-sharing-use-cases-federal-cooperation.md)). Those controls are vendor representations, not proof of the configuration, identity path, or purpose entered in a particular tenant. That distinction matters because Arkansas Tier-1 records establish different evidence classes: Conway's 1,384-row topology and 5,929-row federal-search export, PCSO's externally authored hot-list alerts, and LRPD's deconfliction advisories. The Conway search file establishes federal-tagged activity but does not identify the networks searched or returned. Those records control over a generic policy page when describing Arkansas agency conduct. Two reported incidents further show why tenant and access records are needed. The Associated Press reported that Flock paused federal pilot access following unauthorized-access concerns, and the San Francisco Chronicle reported that Mountain View disabled its cameras after reported unauthorized federal use (web research 2026-07-20, [AP report](../../web%20archive/2026-07-20/apnews.com/flock-federal-pilots-paused-2025-08-25.md); [San Francisco Chronicle report](../../web%20archive/2026-07-20/sfchronicle.com/mountain-view-flock-cameras-disabled-2026-02-03.md)). These are incident-specific secondary reports, not evidence every tenant permitted unauthorized access. - The vocabulary distinction matters: - **Network sharing** = peer access to another agency's *search index* (you can run queries that touch their reads). - **Hot list sharing** = peer subscription to another agency's *alerts* (their plates of interest cause your cameras to alert). - **Federal-prefix sharing** = a relationship configured under Flock's `[Federal]` org naming convention, exposed to federal-officer logins on a national scope. - The Conway production does not surface a per-relationship MOU, warrant, or agency-leadership notification email. That is a production gap, not proof that no such record exists elsewhere. - The central record-supported finding is that **standing configured relationships coexist with thousands of cross-jurisdictional searches**. The export does not reveal every approval or notice process outside its fields. ### Jacksonville permissions view versus topology The 2026-07-30 supplement supplies the missing native topology snapshot. `SharedNetworks_2026_July_29.csv` contains 1,205 organization rows: 276 with `Networks Shared With Me`, 1,107 with `Networks I'm Sharing`, and 178 with both fields populated ([[Jacksonville SharedNetworks Users and Hotlists Exports]], header and full-file parse). The rows establish configured directions, not activity, default settings, relationship authorship, or approval. The supplement also supplies a 317-row Jacksonville-attributed audit and a separate 990,877-row network-audit export spanning 3,135 organization names. Without the export data dictionary, the larger file cannot be described as 990,877 Jacksonville searches or 990,877 searches against Jacksonville data ([[Jacksonville Flock Search Network and Event Audit Exports]]; [[T041 - Jacksonville Tenant Audit vs Network Audit Scope]]). Jacksonville's 12-page outside-agency printout displays 349 `Access` relationships. Search is enabled on 343 and hot-list access on 287, but the artifact does not define direction, reciprocity, camera-level scope, effective dates, or history. It is therefore a permissions view, not a substitute for a native bidirectional SharedNetworks export ([[Jacksonville Flock Access Analytics and Event Logs]], `Devices - Jacksonville AR PD - Admin - Flock Safety - OUTSIDE AGENCY PARTICIPATION.pdf`, pp. 1-12). The same production's event log contains 1,569 `networkShare` events. Those events can support historical reconstruction, but they do not by themselves establish the complete current topology or resolve Conway's December 2025 Jacksonville base/Wing relationship. ### Van Buren and Bentonville August 2026 snapshots Van Buren's August 6 export contains 1,526 unique organization rows. The outward field is populated on 1,390 rows, leaving 1,389 other-organization rows after excluding Van Buren's self-row. Five names carry an explicit `[Federal]` prefix, but that prefix count is not a complete federal-entity classification ([[Van Buren SharedNetworks August 2026]]). Bentonville's August 4 export contains 572 organization rows: 561 inbound, 26 outward, and 15 mutual. Its 4,241-row Network Audit records activity associated with twelve organization labels but does not prove that every query returned Bentonville data ([[Bentonville Organization Access Sharing and Network Audit]]). ### Benton, West Memphis, and Marion August 2026 snapshots Benton's July 30 native CSV contains 855 organization rows: 785 with inbound sharing, 123 with outbound sharing, and 53 populated in both directions (`SharedNetworks_2026_July_30.csv`, header and full table; [[Benton SharedNetworks July 2026]]). West Memphis's August 4 native CSV contains 347 organization rows, while Marion's August 11 printout contains 2,094 visible organization rows across pp. 1-48 ([[West Memphis SkyCop Locations and Flock SharedNetworks August 2026]], `SharedNetworks_2026_August_4.csv`, full table; [[Marion SharedNetworks August 2026]], `Shared Networks_2026_August11 Flock.pdf`, pp. 1-48). The West Memphis CSV names Marion's base and Condor networks inbound and West Memphis outbound; Marion's separate printout contains the corresponding West Memphis row with Marion networks outbound. The two agency records corroborate configured directions on different dates, not relationship authorship, actual searches, or data transfer.