# Surveillance Data Sharing — Default-On Posture A descriptor for the operational posture by which the Conway PD–Flock deployment shares surveillance data across organizational boundaries: **relationships are administrative toggles, not warrants or MOUs. Once toggled, data flows continuously without per-query gating.** The default state of any configured relationship is "on" — sharing happens by default rather than by case-specific authorization. ## How it appears in the corpus The pattern surfaces in four concrete shapes: 1. **Topology** (the relationship inventory) — [[SharedNetworks 2025-12-17 Snapshot]] enumerates 1,384 organizations in Conway's sharing network. The corpus does not surface any per-relationship MOU, signed agreement, or even agency-leadership notification email for any of them. Relationships exist because someone toggled a UI control in the Flock admin interface. 2. **Federal access** (the activity record) — [[Federal Searches CSV]] documents 5,929 federal-LE lookups in 51 days against Conway data, requiring no per-query Conway approval and producing no Conway notification at search time. 3. **Private-business onboarding** — [[Home Depot Camera Sharing Series]] documents a corporate-coordinated state-wide rollout in which six AR Home Depots' cameras became searchable by Conway PD over a one-month window, again with no per-store MOU and no Conway-side legislative or executive sign-off visible. 4. **Activity-side confirmation from a second jurisdiction** — [[Pulaski County Sheriff's Office]]'s § 12-12-1805 report records that **1,645 of 2,092 alerts (79%) in Jan 1 – May 19 2026 came from other agencies' custom hot lists** shared into its networks ([[PCSO ALPR Six-Month Practice and Usage Report]]). PCSO is itself one of the 1,384 organizations enumerated in Conway's snapshot (row 279); the same default-on configuration model produces predominantly other-agency-driven alerting at a second operating end. ## Operational consequence A single configuration decision (toggle on a sharing relationship) enables: - Continuous, indefinite query access from the counterparty. - No per-query Conway-side notice. - No per-query proof-of-purpose verification. - Counterparty's audit log is the only post-hoc accountability mechanism. The default-on posture is the **direct opposite** of the warrant-based model that historically governed law-enforcement data access across jurisdictional boundaries. It is also the **operational target** of the broader investigation: the wiki's analytic spine is the gap between *what surveillance integration is technically routine* and *what legislative or judicial oversight has authorized*. ### In PDFOI-2026-1874 (LRPD Flock emails) The Little Rock PD production reinforces the default-on posture at the level of the individual operator. Flock's Deconfliction Advisory boilerplate states that "the sharing of information involving this LPR overlap is the responsibility of each individual Alert Owner," disclosing each overlapping owner's name, agency email, and often cell phone "for purposes of collaboration and information sharing" ([[Flock Deconfliction Advisories and the LRPD Sharing Network]], Emails 36-63.pdf p. 638; see also Emails 1-24.pdf p. 416). The platform thus shifts the cross-agency sharing decision to individual officers rather than agency-level control: it is not only the agency but individual LRPD officers who hold hot-list alerts that auto-trigger an overlap notice when any partner agency searches a shared plate. Because the [[Flock Deconfliction Advisory]] fires automatically on configured overlap and routes contact details to each owner by default, the same configuration-not-warrant pattern documented in the Conway topology reappears here at the granularity of the line officer — sharing is the standing default and the only friction is an individual owner's discretion after the fact. ## Stakeholders - **Vendor (Flock)** — designed the platform's sharing abstraction; chose default-on UX over default-off. - **Configuring administrators** — at Conway PD, primarily [[Lt. Andrew Burningham]]. - **Counterparty administrators** — at 1,384 organizations. - **Subjects of surveillance** — anyone whose plate has been read by any camera in any network in the topology. No notice, no opt-out. ## Notes - Flock's current public account says agencies may choose 1:1/radius/state sharing, opt into National Lookup, or decline/remove sharing; it describes National Lookup as full-exact-plate only and says searches require a reason and are audited (vendor primary/self-description, [Flock network-sharing statement](../../web%20archive/2026-07-20/flocksafety.com/statement-network-sharing-use-cases-federal-cooperation.md)). That is a description of vendor-stated controls, not evidence of Conway's actual configuration. Conway's Tier-1 1,384-organization topology and 5,929 federal-query export control the Arkansas conduct findings. - Act 668's evidence-of-an-offense sharing language, public-policy duties, and reporting requirements create legal and records tests; they do not by themselves reveal how a vendor tenant was configured. See [[Arkansas Automatic License Plate Reader System Act]]. - The "default-on" framing should be understood as **emergent from the product design plus the absence of policy guardrails**, not as a vendor-asserted "default-on" advertising claim. Flock's UI lets administrators choose; the absence of substantive friction (no MOU, no warrant, no per-share legal review) makes the choice trivially easy to make. Compare to procurement systems where adding a new vendor requires multiple sign-offs — Flock makes adding a new sharing-counterparty as easy as adding a new user permission. - The CPD Policy 800-32 Section D.4 standard for data sharing ("if evidence of an offense is indicated") is the **policy that would prevent** a default-on posture if applied to platform-level relationship configuration. It applies cleanly to per-event sharing decisions; it does not appear to be applied to platform-level relationship toggles. - This concept anchors a broader synthesis. A clean public narrative on default-on sharing as the operational alternative to warrant-and-oversight regimes — for ALPR specifically, for surveillance technology generally — would be useful for legislative and advocacy work.