# Surveillance Data Sharing — Configuration-Based Posture *Erratum, 2026-07-30: this page formerly treated “default-on” as a proved Flock interface state. The Tier-1 vendor email instead calls National Lookup a network of “participating, opt-in agencies” and presents sharing scopes, including “Don’t share at all,” as administrator choices (`Flock Safety Understanding Sharing Search and Audits in the Flock LPR System.msg`, body). SharedNetworks exports establish configured relationships; they do not reveal the tenant's starting default, who enabled a relationship, or whether both sides had to act.* A descriptor for the operational posture documented at Conway PD and replicated in later Arkansas exports: **standing platform relationships and permissions replace a case-by-case Conway relationship decision.** Once a relationship is configured, later activity can occur through that standing configuration. “Configuration-based” describes what the records prove. The historical filename and aliases are retained for link continuity, not as a finding about the vendor's unobserved default setting. ## How it appears in the corpus The pattern surfaces in four concrete shapes: 1. **Topology** — [[SharedNetworks 2025-12-17 Snapshot]] enumerates 1,384 organization rows with at least one sharing direction involving Conway (`SharedNetworks_2025_December_17.csv`, full-file parse). The production does not surface a per-relationship MOU or approval history. The file does not identify who configured the rows. 2. **Federal activity** — [[Federal Searches CSV]] documents 5,929 federal-tagged searches across 31 calendar dates (`Federal Searches March 2026 to April 2026.csv`, header and full-file parse). The export does not name the networks searched or returned and contains no per-search Conway approval or notice field; it does not establish that no separate authorization record existed. 3. **Private-business onboarding** — [[Home Depot Camera Sharing Series]] documents six Arkansas Home Depot camera networks becoming available to Conway during spring 2026. The produced messages show the onboarding path; they do not establish every legal instrument or approval that may exist outside this production. 4. **Activity-side comparison** — [[Pulaski County Sheriff's Office]]'s report records that **1,645 of 2,092 alerts (79%) from 2026-01-01 through 2026-05-19 came from other agencies' custom hot lists** ([[PCSO ALPR Six-Month Practice and Usage Report]], `LPR Report First half 2026.pdf`, p. 2). That is activity evidence, not evidence of the platform's initial sharing default. ## Operational consequence A standing configuration can permit later searches or alerts without a new Conway-side relationship decision for each event. The produced exports show the relationship and some activity, but do not fully define camera scope, duration, identity delegation, approval workflow, or every audit trail. The accountability question is therefore which existing configuration, approval, and audit records document the standing permission. ### In PDFOI-2026-1874 (LRPD Flock emails) The Little Rock PD production documents a related notification workflow. Flock's Deconfliction Advisory boilerplate states that “the sharing of information involving this LPR overlap is the responsibility of each individual Alert Owner” and routes contact information “for purposes of collaboration and information sharing” ([[Flock Deconfliction Advisories and the LRPD Sharing Network]], `Emails 36-63.pdf`, p. 638; see also `Emails 1-24.pdf`, p. 416). The automatic notice follows a configured overlap. It does not prove the tenant's initial sharing default or that an individual alert owner controls the underlying organization-level relationship. ## Stakeholders - **Vendor (Flock)** — designed and operates the platform's sharing abstractions. - **Configuring administrators** — the exports do not identify them; [[Andrew Burningham]] is documented as a Conway Flock administrator, but the corpus does not attribute the 1,384 relationship decisions to him. - **Counterparty administrators** — at 1,384 organizations. - **Subjects of surveillance** — anyone whose plate has been read by any camera in any network in the topology. No notice, no opt-out. ## Notes - Flock's current public account says agencies may choose 1:1/radius/state sharing, opt into National Lookup, or decline/remove sharing; it describes National Lookup as full-exact-plate only and says searches require a reason and are audited (vendor primary/self-description, [Flock network-sharing statement](../../web%20archive/2026-07-20/flocksafety.com/statement-network-sharing-use-cases-federal-cooperation.md)). That is a description of vendor-stated controls, not evidence of Conway's actual configuration. Conway's Tier-1 1,384-row topology and 5,929-row federal-search export control the Arkansas findings within the limits of their fields. - Act 668's evidence-of-an-offense sharing language, public-policy duties, and reporting requirements create legal and records tests; they do not by themselves reveal how a vendor tenant was configured. See [[Arkansas Automatic License Plate Reader System Act]]. - The corpus does not establish the number of steps, approvals, or interface friction required to add a relationship. It establishes the resulting configurations and selected downstream activity. - CPD Policy 800-32 § D.4 says LPR data may be shared with another law-enforcement agency “if evidence of an offense is indicated” ([[CPD Policy 800-32 — License Plate Reader Vehicle Operations]], `Conway PD LPR Policy.pdf`, § D.4). The record does not establish how Conway interpreted that clause for standing platform relationships. - The synthesis that develops this concept across jurisdictions is [[Default-On Surveillance Data Sharing as Operational Model]].