# Surveillance Data Sharing — Default-On Posture A descriptor for the operational posture by which the Conway PD–Flock deployment shares surveillance data across organizational boundaries: **relationships are administrative toggles, not warrants or MOUs. Once toggled, data flows continuously without per-query gating.** The default state of any configured relationship is "on" — sharing happens by default rather than by case-specific authorization. ## How it appears in the corpus The pattern surfaces in four concrete shapes: 1. **Topology** (the relationship inventory) — [[SharedNetworks 2025-12-17 Snapshot]] enumerates 1,384 organizations in Conway's sharing network. The corpus does not surface any per-relationship MOU, signed agreement, or even agency-leadership notification email for any of them. Relationships exist because someone toggled a UI control in the Flock admin interface. 2. **Federal access** (the activity record) — [[Federal Searches CSV]] documents 5,929 federal-LE lookups in 51 days against Conway data, requiring no per-query Conway approval and producing no Conway notification at search time. 3. **Private-business onboarding** — [[Home Depot Camera Sharing Series]] documents a corporate-coordinated state-wide rollout in which six AR Home Depots' cameras became searchable by Conway PD over a one-month window, again with no per-store MOU and no Conway-side legislative or executive sign-off visible. 4. **Activity-side confirmation from a second jurisdiction** — [[Pulaski County Sheriff's Office]]'s § 12-12-1805 report records that **1,645 of 2,092 alerts (79%) in Jan 1 – May 19 2026 came from other agencies' custom hot lists** shared into its networks ([[PCSO ALPR Six-Month Practice and Usage Report]]). PCSO is itself one of the 1,384 organizations enumerated in Conway's snapshot (row 279); the same default-on configuration model produces predominantly other-agency-driven alerting at a second operating end. ## Operational consequence A single configuration decision (toggle on a sharing relationship) enables: - Continuous, indefinite query access from the counterparty. - No per-query Conway-side notice. - No per-query proof-of-purpose verification. - Counterparty's audit log is the only post-hoc accountability mechanism. The default-on posture is the **direct opposite** of the warrant-based model that historically governed law-enforcement data access across jurisdictional boundaries. It is also the **operational target** of the broader investigation: the wiki's analytic spine is the gap between *what surveillance integration is technically routine* and *what legislative or judicial oversight has authorized*. ## Stakeholders - **Vendor (Flock)** — designed the platform's sharing abstraction; chose default-on UX over default-off. - **Configuring administrators** — at Conway PD, primarily [[Lt. Andrew Burningham]]. - **Counterparty administrators** — at 1,384 organizations. - **Subjects of surveillance** — anyone whose plate has been read by any camera in any network in the topology. No notice, no opt-out. ## Notes - The "default-on" framing should be understood as **emergent from the product design plus the absence of policy guardrails**, not as a vendor-asserted "default-on" advertising claim. Flock's UI lets administrators choose; the absence of substantive friction (no MOU, no warrant, no per-share legal review) makes the choice trivially easy to make. Compare to procurement systems where adding a new vendor requires multiple sign-offs — Flock makes adding a new sharing-counterparty as easy as adding a new user permission. - The CPD Policy 800-32 Section D.4 standard for data sharing ("if evidence of an offense is indicated") is the **policy that would prevent** a default-on posture if applied to platform-level relationship configuration. It applies cleanly to per-event sharing decisions; it does not appear to be applied to platform-level relationship toggles. - This concept anchors a broader synthesis. A clean public narrative on default-on sharing as the operational alternative to warrant-and-oversight regimes — for ALPR specifically, for surveillance technology generally — would be useful for legislative and advocacy work.