# D004 — Thesis: The No-LPR-System Position Is a Defensible Custody Statement ## Claim [[Ryan Roach]]'s April 14, 2025 response to the [[Federal Public Defender (Districts of Arkansas)|Federal Public Defender]] — *"Please be advised that ASP does not have a License Plate Reader system."* — was a true-when-made, internally coherent records-custody position, not a falsehood. Within this very thread, both participants with direct authority over the ELSAG architecture — the Houston HIDTA LPR Coordinator who administers the network and the Leonardo representative who services it — independently confirmed the statement's factual predicate: HIDTA, not ASP, owns and operates the server; ASP owned no ELSAG cameras; and under the governing MOU only a camera's owner can produce its data. The requester himself never contested non-possession — he argued only that it was legally beside the point. A custody statement whose substance is corroborated by the system's owner-operator, by its vendor, and — through omission — by its own challenger is not a lie. It is the accurate answer to a custody question, and the record available here supports no other reading. ## Argument **The record fixes ASP's exact words, and they are ordinary.** On the morning of April 14, 2025, the Federal Public Defender's investigator, [[Mike Schriver]], asked ASP for *"information from the Automatic License Plate Reader System"* — a statutory report under A.C.A. § 12-12-1805 that he believed was *"stored for 18 months and available for public view,"* covering *"all the license plate data stored in this system."* The request presupposes a thing: a discrete, ASP-maintained statutory "System" holding a standing public-view report. Roach answered the question a FOIA response exists to answer — what the agency has: *"Please be advised that ASP does not have a License Plate Reader system."* No scare quotes, no lawyered qualification. The quotation marks around "have" — the entire insinuation that ASP deployed a slippery term of art — were added the next day by the requester (*"Regarding your response that ASP does not 'have' a license plate reader system…"*). T007's Statement A therefore inherits the requester's polemical framing, not ASP's sentence. Read as written, the sentence asserts exactly what a records custodian is competent to assert: that ASP does not possess an LPR system from which the demanded report could be pulled. **The system's own authorities corroborate the predicate.** When ASP took the challenge seriously enough to consult the people who actually run the network, both confirmed the custody structure without prompting toward any particular answer. Leonardo's Robert Ryan — the vendor — described the property relations plainly: *"ELSAG is actually the service provider. HIDTA is the owner and operator of the server and each individual agency is the 'owner' of the data they collect in their domain."* April Gough — Houston HIDTA's Financial Assistant and LPR Coordinator, the records authority for the network itself — stated the rule and the fact: *"Per our MOU, the owner of the cameras would have to be the one to provide that information to the requestor. Just because the officer had access to the read, doesn't mean they own the data,"* and, proposed as the accurate public answer: *"ASP does not currently own any ELSAG cameras. ASP does utilize LPRs, but since you don't own the cameras (he refers to in the Hess case) you are not able to provide the data requested."* She grounded this in the MOU's own text (*"I copied the verbiage from our MOU and pasted it below for your reference"*) and identified the actual owner of the Hess-case cameras as a third party — *"Josh,"* a City of Searcy official copied on the email. These are not ASP talking points. They are the network host and the manufacturer describing who owns what. In that architecture there is no object in ASP's custody answering to "a License Plate Reader system that ASP has": the server is HIDTA's, the cameras in question were another agency's, and the data belongs to whoever collected it. **The requester's rebuttal concedes the distinction rather than refuting it.** The strongest witness for Statement A is the challenge written against it. Schriver did not reply that the statement was false — that ASP owns an LPR system. He replied that ownership is irrelevant: *"The Arkansas legislature did not list an exception to ASP nor did the ALPRSA limit its application so that ASP has to 'have' a license plate reader system to be subject to its application – 'use' is the threshold requirement, and ASP does use such technology."* That is a statutory-coverage argument, and it concedes the factual terrain: the Federal Public Defender, holding a trooper's report and carrying every incentive to catch ASP in a lie, chose to argue that "have" does not matter rather than that "does not have" is untrue. His own statutory quotation cuts the same way — § 12-12-1803(b), as he renders it, provides that *"an automatic license plate reader system may be used: (1) by a state, county, or municipal law enforcement agency…"* The [[Arkansas Automatic License Plate Reader System Act]]'s operative verb for agencies is **use**, which presupposes that using and having are separable conditions; a use-permission clause would be redundant if only owners could use. Whether § 12-12-1805's reporting duties reach mere users is a genuine legal question, and ASP may ultimately lose it. But losing a coverage argument does not retroactively convert a true custody statement into a falsehood. "ASP is obligated as a user" and "ASP does not have a system" can both be true — and on this record, both are. **The requester's proof of use is proof of non-possession.** The excerpt from Trooper [[Tanner Hess]]'s report, offered as the smoking gun, describes plate reads from two states: entries on the ELSAG system *"showed that a white Sprinter van…was traveling in Arkansas on 3/26/2024 and was traveling westbound in Texas on 3/26/2024,"* with a later entry *"traveling eastbound in Texas on 4/2/2024"* (vehicle registration withheld per this wiki's surveillance-PII handling). No ASP-owned system returns Texas reads. A trooper whose single query yields multi-state entries is querying a shared, multi-jurisdiction database — exactly the HIDTA-hosted network Ryan and Gough described, and exactly what Gough meant by *"Just because the officer had access to the read, doesn't mean they own the data."* The Federal Public Defender's best evidence against Statement A is, on inspection, an illustration of it. **ASP's conduct is that of an institution applying a custody doctrine, not concealing an operation.** Roach circulated the challenge internally and sought substantive review — *"We received a request below about ASP's use of license plate readers… Would you be free to meet with Jesi and me about this?"* — and [[Dennis Overton]] took it to the vendor and the network host, writing: *"our foia law in Arkansas is very transparent. I know that I'll have to obtain the info from the HIDTA but was just wondering what your thoughts were. We are trying to determine what our reporting parameters are going to be in the future and how we need to change our reports now to make that easier."* An agency running a deception does not call its FOIA law "very transparent," does not plan to fetch the requested information from the system's actual custodian, does not re-engineer its future reports to ease compliance — and above all does not adopt advisor language that affirmatively volunteers *"ASP does utilize LPRs."* Concealing use was never the project. Describing custody accurately was. **The same doctrine reappears, intact, months later.** In the November–December 2025 citizen Flock FOIA, Overton articulates to counsel the identical records-custody framework: FOIA requires an agency *"to share info under FOIA as it applies to YOUR system. Not to anything that applies to OTHER agencies."* Agencies running Flock *"must reply"* to location requests *"because they list their camera locations on their transparency website, and by default, that info is out there"* — whereas fiscal records are conceded open regardless: *"any document dealing with the expenditure of public funds is likely going to be open to foia…"* This is a calibrated, record-by-record doctrine — location records distinguished by vendor posture, contracts open, policies presumptively open — applied consistently to two different requesters seven months apart. Consistency across time and requesters is the signature of an institutional legal position, not an opportunistic lie. On the record available here, ASP's no-LPR-system position is not merely defensible; it is the account of the April 2025 exchange that every knowledgeable voice in these threads — the vendor, the network's owner-operator, and by his own silence the requester — corroborates. ## Evidence **ASP's actual sentence, and the request it answered** - ([[Federal Public Defender FOIA and the No-LPR-System Position]], `RE_ Freedom Of Information Request from Arkansas Federal Public Defender.msg`, "Please be advised that ASP does not have a License Plate Reader system.") — Ryan Roach to Mike Schriver, 2025-04-14, 1:50 PM; preserved verbatim in the quoted chain of ASP's own internal forwards of the thread. - ([[Federal Public Defender FOIA and the No-LPR-System Position]], `RE_ Freedom Of Information Request from Arkansas Federal Public Defender.msg`, "Per Arkansas Code ACA 12-12-1805 which is attached we are needing information from the Automatic License Plate Reader System") — the original request, 2025-04-14, 10:07 AM. - ([[Federal Public Defender FOIA and the No-LPR-System Position]], `RE_ Freedom Of Information Request from Arkansas Federal Public Defender.msg`, "After reviewing the statute it appears the following information is stored for 18 months and available for public view") — the request's premise of a standing public-view store. - ([[Federal Public Defender FOIA and the No-LPR-System Position]], `RE_ Freedom Of Information Request from Arkansas Federal Public Defender.msg`, "We would like the report showing the results of each of the criteria listed above for all the license plate data stored in this system.") — a demand for a compiled report from "this system," not for identified extant records. **The requester's rebuttal — the scare quotes and the pivot to "use"** - ([[Federal Public Defender FOIA and the No-LPR-System Position]], `RE_ Freedom Of Information Request from Arkansas Federal Public Defender.msg`, "Regarding your response that ASP does not 'have' a license plate reader system, our reading of statute A.C.A. 12-12-1805 refers to state entities that 'use' a license plate reader system.") — Schriver, 2025-04-15; the quotation marks around "have" originate here, not in ASP's sentence. - ([[Federal Public Defender FOIA and the No-LPR-System Position]], `RE_ Freedom Of Information Request from Arkansas Federal Public Defender.msg`, "The Arkansas legislature did not list an exception to ASP nor did the ALPRSA limit its application so that ASP has to 'have' a license plate reader system to be subject to its application – 'use' is the threshold requirement, and ASP does use such technology.") — the rebuttal's whole weight rests on coverage-by-use, conceding rather than contesting non-possession. - ([[Federal Public Defender FOIA and the No-LPR-System Position]], `RE_ Freedom Of Information Request from Arkansas Federal Public Defender.msg`, "an automatic license plate reader system may be used: (1) by a state, county, or municipal law enforcement agency…") — § 12-12-1803(b) as quoted by the requester: the Act's own verb for agencies is "use." **The Hess reads — a multi-state, shared network** - ([[Federal Public Defender FOIA and the No-LPR-System Position]], `RE_ Freedom Of Information Request from Arkansas Federal Public Defender.msg`, "Entries on the ELSAG license plate reader system showed that a white Sprinter van") — continuing: the van "was traveling in Arkansas on 3/26/2024 and was traveling westbound in Texas on 3/26/2024," and "The next entry showed" the same van "traveling eastbound in Texas on 4/2/2024" (vehicle registration withheld per surveillance-PII handling). Texas reads cannot originate from an ASP-owned system. **The vendor on ownership** - ([[Federal Public Defender FOIA and the No-LPR-System Position]], `RE_ Freedom Of Information Request from Arkansas Federal Public Defender (1).msg`, "ELSAG is actually the service provider. HIDTA is the owner and operator of the server and each individual agency is the 'owner' of the data they collect in their domain.") — Robert Ryan, Leonardo, 2025-06-04. - ([[Federal Public Defender FOIA and the No-LPR-System Position]], `RE_ Freedom Of Information Request from Arkansas Federal Public Defender (1).msg`, "I'm putting together another email for how to gather requested information from the HIDTA system.") — the requested information lives in "the HIDTA system," and gathering it requires instructions from the vendor. - ([[Federal Public Defender FOIA and the No-LPR-System Position]], `RE_ Freedom Of Information Request from Arkansas Federal Public Defender (1).msg`, "I believe he is correct with his explanation, but his request is facially invalid because he is not requesting specific dates.") — the vendor treats the requester's coverage argument and the custody/production question as separate issues, exactly as this thesis does. **HIDTA — the system's owner-operator — on custody** - ([[Federal Public Defender FOIA and the No-LPR-System Position]], `RE_ Freedom Of Information Request from Arkansas Federal Public Defender (7).msg`, "Per our MOU, the owner of the cameras would have to be the one to provide that information to the requestor. Just because the officer had access to the read, doesn't mean they own the data.") — April Gough, Houston HIDTA Financial Assistant and LPR Coordinator, 2025-06-04. - ([[Federal Public Defender FOIA and the No-LPR-System Position]], `RE_ Freedom Of Information Request from Arkansas Federal Public Defender (7).msg`, "Simply put 'ASP does not currently own any ELSAG cameras. ASP does utilize LPRs, but since you don't own the cameras (he refers to in the Hess case) you are not able to provide the data requested.") — the network's records coordinator states ASP's camera ownership as zero and proposes language that admits use while denying ownership. - ([[Federal Public Defender FOIA and the No-LPR-System Position]], `RE_ Freedom Of Information Request from Arkansas Federal Public Defender (7).msg`, "If he wants to request the data from Josh, then he will have to track him down and send a new request.") — the Hess-case camera owner is a third party; the message's cc line places "Josh" at `[email protected]`. - ([[Federal Public Defender FOIA and the No-LPR-System Position]], `RE_ Freedom Of Information Request from Arkansas Federal Public Defender (7).msg`, "I copied the verbiage from our MOU and pasted it below for your reference.") — the custody rule is anchored in MOU text, not improvised for the occasion. **ASP's internal posture** - ([[Federal Public Defender FOIA and the No-LPR-System Position]], `RE_ Freedom Of Information Request from Arkansas Federal Public Defender (2).msg`, "Yes sir… our foia law in Arkansas is very transparent. I know that I'll have to obtain the info from the HIDTA but was just wondering what your thoughts were. We are trying to determine what our reporting parameters are going to be in the future and how we need to change our reports now to make that easier.") — Overton, 2025-06-04 (same text preserved in `RE_ Freedom Of Information Request from Arkansas Federal Public Defender (5).msg`): ASP must obtain the information from HIDTA, and is adjusting future reporting to ease compliance. - ([[Federal Public Defender FOIA and the No-LPR-System Position]], `RE_ Freedom Of Information Request from Arkansas Federal Public Defender.msg`, "We received a request below about ASP's use of license plate readers and LtC. Aaron mentioned that you may have some helpful insight/information into this. Would you be free to meet with Jesi and me about this?") — Roach routing the challenge for substantive review, 2025-04-16. **The same custody doctrine in the Flock thread** - ([[Citizen Flock FOIA and ASP Withholding Strategy]], `RE_ Flock FOIA - ASP.msg`, "My understanding of FOIA is that you are required to share info under FOIA as it applies to YOUR system. Not to anything that applies to OTHER agencies.") — Overton to Roach, 2025-12-08: the custody principle stated as general doctrine. - ([[Citizen Flock FOIA and ASP Withholding Strategy]], `RE_ Flock FOIA - ASP.msg`, "Flock is different, because they list their camera locations on their transparency website, and by default, that info is out there, so agencies with Flock must reply.") — the distinction between agencies turns on records posture, not on evasion. - ([[Citizen Flock FOIA and ASP Withholding Strategy]], `RE_ Flock FOIA - ASP.msg`, "In reality, any document dealing with the expenditure of public funds is likely going to be open to foia…") — fiscal records conceded open; the doctrine is calibrated, not obstruction-for-its-own-sake. - ([[Citizen Flock FOIA and ASP Withholding Strategy]], `RE_ Flock FOIA - ASP.msg`, "Since you are in the HIDTA system, the only data sharing 'agreement' you have is with the HIDTA MOU, OR what is listed in your policy and procedure documents.") — ASP's participation is framed, internally and consistently, as membership in the HIDTA system. ## Anticipated counterarguments Acknowledged and left unengaged here: 1. **The Statement-B record.** T007 cites a procurement and deployment corpus not examined in this thesis — the Leonardo term contract and purchase orders, 39 F4 fixed-camera installs with HIDTA-EOC site naming, an ASP-administered ELSAG domain, hot lists, operator training, and analyst access — which may show ASP owning and operating a system in the plain sense. 2. **Timing.** Gough's "does not currently own any ELSAG cameras" is dated June 4, 2025; if ASP camera ownership or F4 deployment predates April 14, 2025, the custody predicate of Roach's sentence weakens or fails. 3. **"System" is bigger than cameras.** An ASP-administered domain with hot lists, trained operators, and query access could be argued to constitute "having" a system even with zero owned cameras. 4. **Effect over accuracy.** A one-sentence "does not have," with no referral to HIDTA or to the camera owner, functioned as a deflection; a technically true statement can still be materially misleading in FOIA practice. 5. **Post-hoc rationalization.** The vendor and HIDTA consultations occurred six weeks after the response; the custody theory could be characterized as assembled to justify a denial already issued. 6. **The "easy denial" posture.** Overton's Flock-thread coaching ("This one is an easy denial in my opinion…") can be read as evidence of a withholding-first institutional culture bearing on the April statement's intent. 7. **Provenance.** Roach's April 14 email survives in this production as quoted-chain text within later messages rather than as a standalone sent item. 8. **Statutory mootness.** If § 12-12-1805 keys duties to "use" — as the requester argued and the vendor thought "correct" — the have/use distinction, however accurate, would not diminish the reporting obligations the Federal Public Defender sought to enforce.