# Arkansas Criminal Intelligence Network The **Arkansas Criminal Intelligence Network (ACIN)** is a multi-agency public-safety initiative developed through the [[Sixth Judicial District Prosecuting Attorney's Office]] and [[Little Rock Police Department]]. Its records describe statewide integration of agency RMS and other investigative sources for cross-jurisdiction search, alerts, relationship analysis, geospatial and temporal analysis, case narratives, phone and movement analysis, and human-reviewed AI. The final production establishes proposals, agreements, policies, project status reports, and executed vendor packages. It does not establish a DOJ award, approved final budget, payment, completed integration, or live statewide operation. ## Origin ACIN's project-origin report says [[Kelly Ward]] approached then-LRPD Major [[Casey P. Clark]] in November 2023 and that Clark presented the regional CACIN concept in January 2024 to LRPD Chief [[Heath Helton]], Ward, and Prosecuting Attorney [[Will Jones]] ([[ACIN Origin and Project Evolution]], `BRF-202_ACIN_Project_Evolution_Origin_2025-09-30.pdf`, p. 1). The January proposal contemplated Microsoft Azure/Fabric, RMS pooling, RapidDNA/NIBIN, LPR and other databases, and a public application, with a three-year estimate of $2.29-$3.79 million ([[ACIN Historical Quotes and Proposals]], `FIN-006_CACIN_Proposal_2024-01-01.pdf`, pp. 1-4). The project later expanded statewide and submitted a $5.464816 million federal request. ## Vendor architecture - **[[Peregrine Technologies, Inc.]] through [[Carahsoft Technology Corp.]]:** executed $3 million package for data integration, search, workflows, alerts, geospatial, link, and temporal analysis, with up to 4,000 users and a 45-agency phased scope ([[Peregrine and Carahsoft Executed Contract]], `CON-002_Peregrine_Carahsoft_Executed_Contract_2026-03-17.pdf`, pp. 2-5, 20-23). - **[[LeadsOnline]]:** executed package for LeadSuite, six NightHawk licenses, and two CellHawk licenses at $233,374.98 annually. It covers automated case ingestion, narratives, deconfliction, pawn/secondhand and ballistic sources, phone extractions, communications, movement, devices, vehicles, locations, and LPR hits ([[LeadsOnline Executed Contract]], `CON-001_LeadsOnline_Executed_Contract_2026-07-13.pdf`, pp. 15-17, 25-26, 46-47). Both packages contain funding contingencies. The production contains no funding-availability notice, payment, acceptance, active-user export, or completed-integration record. > [!contradiction] Federal funding language versus controlling status > ACIN documents say grant funding "has been obtained," that authorization was complete, and that ACIN accepts an award. The clearinghouse records condition action on receipt of funding, and the final custodian email says DOJ had not issued an award package or approved a final budget as of 2026-07-23. [[T029 - ACIN Funding Obtained Language vs No Federal Award]] resolves the status for that date: the project remained proposed and contingent. ## Data scope and analytical reach The standard MOU and integration policy say ACIN shares incident-report information and excludes investigative files ([[ACIN Agreements and Participation Terms]], `AGR-201_El_Dorado_PD_MOU_EXECUTED_2026-05-15.pdf`, p. 1; [[ACIN Policy and Operations Manual]], `POL-301_ACIN_Policy_and_Operations_Manual_REDACTED_2026-01.pdf`, p. 16). > [!contradiction] Incident-only boundary versus investigative services > The same manual defines case notes, attachments, and suspect associations as investigative data, and the LeadsOnline package covers complete case files, narratives, phone extractions, communications, movement, and locations (`POL-301_ACIN_Policy_and_Operations_Manual_REDACTED_2026-01.pdf`, p. 47; `CON-001_LeadsOnline_Executed_Contract_2026-07-13.pdf`, pp. 15-17, 25, 46-47). The implemented scope remains open at [[T030 - ACIN Incident-Report-Only Scope vs Investigative Data Services]]. Those capabilities materially deepen [[T014 - ACIN Analytical Reach vs Non-Surveillance Classification]]. Contract capability is not proof that each feature was activated, but the contracts displace the first batch's earlier vendor-and-feature uncertainty. ## Participation The March Peregrine scope names 22 Phase 1 data contributors, Prairie Grove as access-only, and 22 Phase 2 agencies. The July table instead contains 44 rows: 21 Phase 1, 20 Phase 2, one exploratory, and two non-data. The agreement folder contains 38 files bearing 27 named agency units. > [!contradiction] Roster and agreement drift > El Dorado has a May-signed MOU, but the July table says "Not Signed." Pine Bluff, Forrest City, and Helena appear in the contract but not the July table, while Benton County Sheriff's Office and the Attorney General's Office appear in the table but not the contract. See [[T032 - ACIN Participation Rosters and Agreement Status]]. ## Governance, ownership, and retention ACIN documents say originating agencies retain ownership, the Third Agency Rule controls release, and access follows least privilege with logged queries and quarterly review ([[ACIN Agreements and Participation Terms]], `AGR-201_El_Dorado_PD_MOU_EXECUTED_2026-05-15.pdf`, pp. 2-4; [[ACIN Policy and Operations Manual]], `POL-301_ACIN_Policy_and_Operations_Manual_REDACTED_2026-01.pdf`, pp. 18, 22, 26, 44). > [!contradiction] Existing approved board versus future formal governance > The January manual claims review and approval by a board and embeds eleven-member bylaws. The April kickoff packet calls the initial group informal and nonvoting and targets a later interlocal agreement and formal board. See [[T031 - ACIN Board Approval Claims vs Future Formal Governance]]. The manual contains overlapping five-year, seven-year, originating-agency, and record-class schedules. Peregrine and LeadsOnline add 30/60-day exit windows and vendor-specific audit retention. The authoritative field-level hierarchy remains unresolved. ## AI governance ACIN's materials invoke Act 848, the statewide AI policy, human review, approved systems, auditability, training, and prohibitions on autonomous arrests and AI-only probable cause ([[ACIN AI Policy and CLEST Training Packet]]). The CLEST package is prepared but carries blank approval and course-number fields; no external course approval or completed system risk assessment appears. ## Open questions - Did DOJ later issue an award or approved budget, and did ACIN then send the contractual funds-availability notice? - Which integrations, data sources, vendor services, users, alerts, and analytical functions became active? - What is the authoritative participant roster and implemented data dictionary? - Which board legally approved each policy and contract, and where are its roster, votes, and minutes? - How are originating-agency, central ACIN, Peregrine, and LeadsOnline retention and audit obligations reconciled?