# Arkansas Criminal Intelligence Network The **Arkansas Criminal Intelligence Network (ACIN)** describes itself as a statewide public-safety initiative that connects participating records-management systems so law-enforcement agencies and prosecutors can share and analyze incident-based information across jurisdictional lines. The first production is a public-facing media package; it establishes ACIN's official description of the project, not independent proof that every described control, integration, or statewide capability is implemented. ## Architecture and analytical role - ACIN says it "connects participating Records Management Systems (RMS) into a CJIS-compliant cloud environment" ([[ACIN Executive Overview 2026-05-15]], p. 1). - It says participating agencies can "share and analyze incident-report information in near real time" ([[ACIN Executive Overview 2026-05-15]], p. 2). - The named functions include "investigative search, cross-jurisdiction case linking, relationship analysis, investigative dashboards, pattern identification, and real-time investigative alerts" ([[ACIN Executive Overview 2026-05-15]], p. 3). - ACIN's AI fact sheet adds possible links among "people, vehicles, locations, and events" while stating that AI does not make arrests, charging decisions, or operational decisions ([[ACIN AI Fact Sheet]], p. 1, "AI assists investigators - it does not make arrests, charging decisions, or operational decisions"). ## Institutional origin and governance ACIN says it was developed through a partnership between the [[Sixth Judicial District Prosecuting Attorney's Office]] and the [[Little Rock Police Department]] ([[ACIN Executive Overview 2026-05-15]], p. 1, "Developed through a partnership between the 6th Judicial District Prosecuting Attorney's Office and the Little Rock Police Department"). Its one-page sheet gives a 2024 founding year, Little Rock headquarters, and [[Casey P. Clark]] as Executive Director ([[ACIN One-Page Fact Sheet]], p. 1, "Founded 2024"; "Headquarters Little Rock, Arkansas"; "Executive Director Casey P. Clark"). The package attributes oversight to a multi-agency board composed of participating law-enforcement leadership, prosecutorial representatives, and technical advisors ([[ACIN Executive Overview 2026-05-15]], p. 3, "The network is overseen by an Oversight and Governance Board"). No board charter, roster, minutes, voting rule, appointment record, or delegated-authority instrument appears in this batch. ## Data control and security claims ACIN says participating agencies retain ownership and control of contributed data and invokes a [[Third Agency Rule]] under which one participant cannot release another participant's information without originating-agency authorization ([[ACIN Privacy and Security Overview 2026-05-15]], p. 2, "Participating agencies retain ownership and control"; "cannot release another agency's information without authorization from the originating agency"). It names AWS GovCloud hosting, multi-factor authentication, role-based access, encryption, continuous monitoring, and activity logging ([[ACIN Privacy and Security Overview 2026-05-15]], p. 1, "Secure AWS GovCloud infrastructure"; "Full audit logging and monitoring"). The production includes no configuration record, audit export, security assessment, certification, or underlying policy with which to test these statements. > [!contradiction] Analytical reach versus ACIN's non-surveillance classification > ACIN describes near-real-time incident-data sharing, cross-jurisdiction case linking, relationship analysis, dashboards, pattern identification, alerts, and AI-assisted links among people, vehicles, locations, and events ([[ACIN Executive Overview 2026-05-15]], pp. 2-3, "share and analyze incident-report information in near real time"; "relationship analysis, investigative dashboards, pattern identification, and real-time investigative alerts"; [[ACIN AI Fact Sheet]], p. 1, "possible connections between people, vehicles, locations, and events"). The same package says ACIN is "not a criminal intelligence database," "not a public surveillance system," and not designed for mass surveillance ([[ACIN Executive Overview 2026-05-15]], p. 2, "ACIN is not a criminal intelligence database"; [[ACIN FAQ 2026-05-15]], p. 1, "ACIN is not a public surveillance system and is not designed for mass surveillance activities"). The documents do not supply the schemas, retention rules, policies, participant agreements, or legal analysis needed to resolve those classifications. See [[T014 - ACIN Analytical Reach vs Non-Surveillance Classification]]. ## Open questions - Which agencies participate, what fields and historical depth are synchronized, and how frequently does each connection update? - Which vendors provide the RMS integration, search, analytics, alerts, and AI components? - What board charter, policies, audits, misuse investigations, access reviews, and retention schedules exist? - What procurement, grant, and budget records support the initiative?